I. Introduction
The aim of this article is to introduce the reader to developments in treaty interpretation theory and practice in the United States. It is designed, in particular, to guide readers from other countries in understanding that endeavour and in situating it in the context of theories of interpretation being developed and contested in other fields of American law. There has been a veritable explosion of theoretical writing on interpretation in such fields as Constitutional law, the construction of statutes and the interpretation of contracts. That mass can only be tersely summarized here. These theories arose in an environment influenced bow by intellectual currents and by political power struggles in the United States; the former aspect suggests that they might be exportable whereas the latter indicates that they may be specific to the United States. This article explores whether those modes might make a useful contribution to the process of construing treaties or whether, on the other hand, they might threaten the degree of international consensus that presently prevails about the meaning of treaties. Such disagreement might complicate both the jobs of the drafters of an agreement between nations with divergent traditions and the tasks of tribunals and other interpreters who are called upon to generate authoritative readings of conventions. Would it, on the other hand, bring forth interpretations that are more just or better?
This article bypasses the more exotic types of interpretation theory -semiotics, Critical Legal Studies, post modernism and the like -that have been ignored or Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Tbe author is indebted for thoughtful reading and cri tkism to James Boyle, Louis Henkin and Frederick Schaucr. I thank Alicia Curry, Catalina Garay and Natalie Muecke for research assistance.
but some understanding of this material is a necessary predicate to a comprehension of the problems of those charged with construing these documents. And it is easier to compare the problems of interpreting treaties with those involved in construing other bodies of legal documents when one has a bird's eye view of the domain.
There is a great deal of material here. Precisely how much can never be known; there is no international register where all treaties are filed so as to create a complete inventory such as that in the United States Code or comparable legislative assemblages. The Case Amendment 3 requires the submission of all agreements to Congress and publication ordinarily follows, though a new parsimoniousness has caused slower publication. And some agreements escape the Case Amendment's sweep, being regarded as too informal and unimportant to be fully dealt with.
4 Quite a few agreements that antedate the Amendment are still in force. With those qualifications one can accept as reasonably accurate the count that the United States is a party to over 10,000 agreements of which over 1,000 are 'treaties' in the special American sense of having received Senate advice and consent. 5 As to other countries one can say that the major actors publish two or three volumes of treaties per year. In theory the United Nations Treaty Series in its 1,250 volumes should be a complete listing of agreements. Plainly we are dealing with a large corpus of work, one that affords lots of cases for analysis but is hard to organize and generalize. Many of the treaties within this corpus are in fact quite standardized and routine, even when they are quite important, and questions about their meaning can be settled at low and invisible levels of bureaucracy.
There are no established systems for dividing up the body of treaties. 6 There are some obvious subject matter differences. For example, bilateral investment agreements, extradition treaties, income tax treaties and treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation tend to separate themselves out into special groupings. The same experts tend to represent the governments involved each time such a treaty is negotiated. They tend to compare the phraseology of agreements within the genre and draw inferences from omissions, additions or changes in terminology.
7 They tend to attract the following of a group of professional specialists. More generally, theoreticians tend to distinguish some very broad categories for their own purposes. They would distinguish between pacts which are primarily contracts between two States, each State promising a quid pro quo as part of an exchange, and agreements which arc designed to lay down rules primarily for the governance of private parties. 8 The first category would embrace such arrangements as the destroyers-for-bases deal of 1940 between the United States and Britain. An example of the second is found in the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad of 1969.
9 Scholars might also separate treaties that establish international organizations as being quasiconstitutionaL These therefore call for special treatment in the light of the necessity of adaptation over a longer period of time to the necessities of the age.
B. The Negotiation of Treaties
Negotiating processes fall into a fairly regular pattern. At the outset one has to notice that there may be two different sets of negotiations precedent to one ultimate agreement In the first one, a coalition is established within State X (and usually within the government of X) to establish the proposition that there should be negotiated a treaty with State Y along agreed-upon lines. Only when that has been done can delegates of X be nominated who will then carry out on behalf of X the discussions needed to establish the text of an international agreement Where ratification will be necessary mere is then a need for assembling a coalition with the political power to push a ratification through the Senate or comparable legislative body.
It is relatively easy to trace the process of internal coalition-building within the United States government because it is highly formalized. The so-called Circular 175 process prescribes a procedure through which the proposal to negotiate is circulated to the relevant bureaux of the Department of State and, at times, to other agencies for their comments and clearance.
11 Contacts with the congressional committees having jurisdiction over the subject matter are also called for, that is particularly true if the proponents of the negotiation have reason to worry about future disputes as to whether a treaty or a congressionally authorized executive agreement is the appropriate way to proceed. 12 In the modern decentralized Congress, where the heads of important committees no longer carry the weight that former leaders did, the task of lining up the committees can be difficult 13 One must include the committees which have control over the legislation needed to implement the agreement as well as the foreign relations panels.
The widely varying political systems of national states mean that widely differing rituals precede international treaty negotiations. Dictators can make up their own minds about pursuing international agreements. A parliamentary democracy can confine its struggles to the cabinet or its delegates in a wide variety of cases. But in critical situations it becomes necessary to sound out the support of parliament and sometimes the electorate. The path to a negotiating consensus is not necessarily easy in authoritarian or parliamentary states.
14 A striking example is the accession of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Mexico made a false start in the early 1980s under President Lopez Portillo and it was not until 1986 that President Miquel de la Madrid was able to muster the support to move forward. 13 All sorts of protectionist and free trade interests and sentiments within the business community had to be dealt with in mobilizing a majority.
In the course of assembling the internal coalition a certain amount of written history is developed -more in the United States than in other countries. In some cases formal congressional hearings are held and the transcript is available. But in more cases the documentation is kept within the government and is not available, at least not immediately, to outside researchers. Governments believe that their negotiating freedom while dealing with their foreign government counterpart will be impaired if a full account of the compromises and side-agreements on the home front is available to the other side.
The negotiation of agreements between States is as a rule a rather formal matter. We are not dealing here with the types of hasty and careless arrangements that courts often have to construe in domestic contract litigation. An international interpreter does not usually have to try to patch together an offer and acceptance out of a series of telexes. 16 For the most part the representatives of the two States have legal advisors who have aided in the development of carefully developed positions, including attempts to forecast die approaches of the other side. They have models of comparable agreements and ready-made formulations. This is not to suggest that negotiations so prepared will not generate problems of interpretation but rather niat the problems will be more likely to arise from over-calculation, from excessively diplomatic formulations that fail to confront anticipated problems with ruthless objectivity, from vagueness designed to postpone insoluble problems, or from disparate tacit reservations held by die parties. A more formal mode goes with the hammering out of multilateral arrangements. For example, agreements sponsored by the United Nations go through several stages. The International Law Commission (ILQ may begin the process.
18 A reporter is engaged to produce a draft The draft is considered by the Commission as a body and amendments are approved or rejected. When a revised draft has been provided by the reporter and approved by the Commission, the UN General Assembly will in all likelihood issue a call for a diplomatic conference to negotiate an agreement on the basis of the draft At this conference diplomats rather than lawyers take the front row and, if all goes well, the ILC draft is amended and fine-tuned so as to make it suitable for widespread acceptance. Agreements of this type include the treaty on the law of treaties, the conventions on diplomatic and consular immunities, the less-widely accepted agreements on state succession and so on. 19 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was, on the other hand, drafted from the beginning by a diplomatic conference that worked from 1974 to its completion in 1982.
20
These international multilateral negotiations are sufficiently different from each other so that it is not possible to write the type of generalizing study that students have written about the process of legislation 21 in the United States Congress. There committees stay in place and pass (or bury) different drafts of legislation so that it is possible to do comparative and statistical analysis of a fairly large population of laws and to discover trends and contrasts. Books have been written about the process of the Law of the Sea Convention, but they lack some of the theoretical power of public interest oriented works on domestic legislation. 22 They do, however, point to some general characteristics mat have implications for the interpretation of the product First, one sees the critical role played by the drafter or drafters. A strong-willed and adept chair of a drafting committee can manoeuvre a draft through a mass of delegates, many of them unskilled or uninterested. Second, we observe the enormous power of consensus when the process is advanced. The desire not to block a draft that is widely approved, coupled with a sense that the exact wording of the draft may not make too much practical difference, given the soft enforcement of international law, leads many states not to dissent from provisions of which they do not really approve. This is particularly true of States that do not have the superpower status of the United States, which felt capable of torpedoing the Law of the Sea Convention because of its dislike of certain sections. 
Dctlcv F. Vagts
The international negotiating mntm^ of the typical bilateral and multilateral process are very different. After the eruption of the disagreement between the US Senate; and the Reagan administration over the interpretation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, masses of negotiating materials were discovered.
23 They had to be unearthed from the files of the executive agencies that had participated in the dialogue with the Russians and much of it had to be declassified for use in the debate. The dangers of selective resort to the mass of negotiating documents by the party with the best access to them are obvious.
A multilateral convention that has ground through the International Law Commission process is accompanied by a great deal of published legislative historytravaux priparatoires as the internationalists prefer to call it The trail begins with the reporter's draft and the comments that accompany it; then debates ensue within the ELC that are reported more or less verbatim. There may then be a new draft and reports and another plenary debate. A similar process with regard to the Law of the Sea Convention provided a similarly massive set of travaux priparatoires. We will see later that there is acute controversy in the international law community over the resort to such materials in interpreting the finished product 24 After a treaty has been signed at the international level it may have to be forwarded to the signatory States for the completion of whatever confirmatory processes may be necessary or customary under their national law to make a treaty binding upon them. The US senatorial advice and consent process is the most notorious of these, although parliamentary approval is called for under a great many constitutions. 22 In the United States the President must first transmit the proposed treaty to the Senate; the transmittal is accompanied by explanations of what was intended. 26 Officers of the executive branch, as well as other interested parties, testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and submit written statements. 27 The Committee provides a report commenting on the treaty (and it may propose reservations or clarifications).
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The Senate may debate the granting of its advice and consent and may in fact demand modifications before it assents.
29 All of this generates public material that tells us something about the meaning various Americans attributed to the treaty. What this is within that practice; and (4) minimal consensus as to the existence of a text and a reading of it that is needed to provide a working distinction between interpretation and invention. Can one fairly describe the parties involved in drafting and interpreting a treaty as an interpretive community? Not if one reads into the term the evocative aspects suggested by the use of the term community (Gemeinscfwft) in sociology, as contrasted with the cooler, more conscious network of a society (Gesellschqft)?
6 Nor if one expects the intimacy and continuity assigned to the term by modem communitarian political theory. 37 But those who practise treaty law seem to share enough of the basic points of consensus, concerns and boundaries cited above to form an interpretive community in a meaningful sense.
38 Their ability to work and dispute together in international fora and to share the ideas about interpretation discussed in the next section seem to point in that direction. This international collegiality of elites from different countries may of course pull each of mem away from the consensus prevailing in the interpretive community or communities to which they belong at home. These national communities have considerable power to draw those with dual membership into the national orbit, as will be shown in the next section.
HL International Interpretation

A. Institutions of International Interpretation
When an international text is established, the function of attributing meaning to it may fall to many different people in different roles. A lawyer tends to look to the courts as the authoritative givers of meaning. But courts do not play the central role in attributing meaning to international documents that they perform in domestic matters. The International Court of Justice decides only a handful of cases a year and only a limited number of them can be said to hinge upon the interpretation of a treaty. 39 Thus it cannot serve the function that domestic courts have of casting a shadow within which private parties can dispose of cases that do not go to court. For one thing it does not have the flow of 'easy cases' that bolster the authority of national tribunals. 40 Those easy cases are then reflected in dozens of disputes that are settled extra-judicially in the light of their guidance and which confirm judicial authority. Nor do other arbitral tribunals do much to fill the gap. This comment does not, however, fully apply to the work of a few regional tribunals that regularly interpret the constitutive documents of the international organization to which they belong, namely: the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
One might plausibly look to national courts as the substitute for international tribunals in the interpretation process. But that has disappointing aspects. In the absence of a strong international reviewing authority -such as the European Court of Justice or European Court of Human Rights -national courts have only their homegrown integrity and good intentions to keep them on the path of internationally acceptable constructions. Few judges have any substantial experience with foreign relations, 41 few of them have had any significant portion of their legal education abroad and the libraries they use may lack international materials. They are largely untouched by criticism or other professional pressures from outside the country in which they practice. And the pressures of the judicial peer group within that country are daily and intense. The subject matter also pushes courts into separate directions.
There is a complex matrix of domestic law surrounding most issues of international treaty law. In some States the courts follow a rule that puts treaties first in priority and mandates adjusting domestic rules to them. 42 In others, especially the United States, courts are required to give the Constitution and later statutes priority over treaties if they cannot be reconciled. In either case, the temptation to take the local practice for the important reality is powerful -witness the way in which American courts have put the Hague Convention on Obtaining Evidence together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in such a way as to minimize disturbance of the American way of litigating.
43 And many treaties cannot get to the courts -for reasons such as the complainant's lack of standing, and the concept of the non-self-executing treaty. 44 On the whole, it is a matter of some surprise that national courts have done so well in reading international agreements in a reasonably uniform way that has caused relatively little friction.
Thus the dialogue of State parties over interpretation goes on largely unaided by adjudication. Who acts for parties? In the first instance, they are national governments, typically but not always the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These agencies conduct the formal diplomatic exchanges which find their way into the digests as authoritative national views about the meaning of the obligations contained in agreements. 43 The same authorities also furnish advice to their nationals who come to them for guidance as to the rights and obligations contained in the agreements. In many countries the executive is the interpreter of treaties, and the courts overtly defer to them whenever a treaty question comes within their range. 46 And even in countries like the United States where the courts continue to assert the ultimate authority over treaty interpretation the courts tend to give 'great' or 'decisive' weight to executive branch
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The United States rale is that tbe later in time as between treaty and statute prevail* although a strong effort will be made to reconcile the two. Restatement ( determinations. 47 The executive's interpretive power here is therefore much less controverted than in a statutory context 48 Many of the government interpreters of treaties are not themselves members of the international community of lawyers. They include army officers instructing their forces on the appropriate standards for handling prisoners of war, treasury officials assessing taxes or releasing blocked funds, customs agents levying duties or enforcing marking requirements, immigration officers dealing with claims of status as refugees or treaty investors and so forth.
In general the legislative branch must play a limited role in the interpretive process. It can, however, malr* its views felt in various ways. If legislative approval is required before a treaty can become effective, it can insist on clarifying reservations and understandings that will constrict the freedom of the executive to interpret the treaty in ways ex ante foreseen and condemned by the legislature. There is not much that it can do directly about problems that arise ex post. It can amend the implementing legislation to make the treaty's local effect correspond to its view of the meaning of the treaty. And it can threaten the use of its powers, such as the appropriation power and the appointment power to penalize an executive that has in its view gone beyond the bounds of the permissible readings of the agreement. But it cannot simply hand down directives that will represent a binding reading of the treaty. 50 through teaching or writing they inform the other actors in this system about their authoritative views on meaning. And in the absence of other powerful assigners of meaning, their role here looms larger than that traditionally assigned to professors in domestic legal processes.
For the most part these interpretive functions are exercised in good faith, that is, the parties and their advisors believe in the validity or defensibility of their views on the meaning of treaties. But it is not cynical to note that the absence of a reliable check in the nature of disinterested third party adjudication of issues makes it easier to listen to one's own interests and preferences when taking a position on international agreements. All of this rather loose treatment of treaty construction is echoed in the attitudes of those who set about the tasks of drafting them. They may try to be unsparing in their precision so as to make disputation impossible. Or they may reserve the right to terminate their country's commitment to the treaty upon little or no notice so that they can respond to adverse interpretation by opting out entirely,
B. The International Interpretive Tradition
The international law interpretive tradition has a long history, going back to Grotius and the sixteenth century. It differs from American approaches in its greater emphasis on the text and its aversion to teleology. 51 These differences were highlighted during the process of codifying the international law of treaties during die 1960s which culminated in the Vienna Convention.
The Vienna Conference produced a Convention of 85 articles, three of which deal with interpretation. 52 These articles have been accused of being entirely eclectic, embracing all interpretive approaches. 53 But most observers see them as establishing a hierarchy with 'ordinary miming' at the top. Original intent gets a secondary role when it appears that a special meaning was intended by the parties. In such a case die use of travauxpriparatoires is justified in order to find that intenL Teleology gets little room: a mild form of teleology is embodied in the notion of interpretation 'in good faith' and in the reference to the 'object and purpose' of the treaty.
These provisions were anything but non-controversial. Under the leadership of Professor Myres McDougal, the United States delegation went on the attack. Everybody recognized that this formulation gave a strong tilt towards textual analysis and that it downplayed the use of secondary sources and arguments that may have influenced the negotiations, but which were not included in the final language. But the McDougal amendment which would have put in a single list all the interpretive instruments contained in the draft Convention, received 'scant support', 54 and the Vienna approach continues to animate the case-law of the International Court of Justice. The Court regards it as expressing the customary law of treaties, even in cases where one or both litigants is not a party to it 55 Even American courts regularly cite the Convention, although the United States is not a party.
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C Special International Interpretive Issues
The Travaux Preparatoires Question
Consistent with its emphasis on the text, the Vienna Convention was grudging in its acquiescence in the idea that, if all else failed, a treaty interpreter might examine the travaux preparatoires for guidance. 57 Although the treatment of travaux is part of the general plain meaning approach which is characteristic of international law, it has additional aspects of its own. Many of the major players on the international scene ignore legislative history in interpreting national statutes.
38 Some States keep no such records. In domestic quarrels, recourse to legislative history poses problems of equality as between litigants and lawyers, favouring lawyers for the national government, private practitioners with offices in the capital and wealthy litigators. On the international plane there are even risks of governments being disadvantaged.
39
This is particularly true in the case of multilateral conventions. These tend to generate. masses of legislative documents. A State may not have a full set of these even if it participated in the convention. The chance of this occurring is even higher if it did not participate in the negotiations, but later acceded to the treaty, out of a general sense that it would be sound policy to adhere to an agreement which appears satisfactory on its face and is widely supported. Perhaps the most dramatic episode involving travaux arose from an attempt to use, in the interpretation of a post World War II treaty with Germany, passages from negotiations among the other parties to the treaty from which the German delegation had been deliberately excluded, being admitted only to sign the agreement presented by the victors. The arbitral tribunal found this inappropriate, 60 although it might have seen the situation differently if it had regarded the agreement as dictated rather than negotiated. Despite such episodes, courts regularly rummage through travaux in search of guidance. National courts have done so both in countries like the United States where the resort to domestic legislative history is common and in countries such as Great Britain where it is not 61 The International Court of Justice has expressed scepticism about travaux though it has used diem at times, usually to reinforce a reading arrived at on other grounds. 62 In particular, Judge Alvarez advocated an exclusionary practice, arguing that pursuing the intent of the founders would frustrate a search for the best adaptation of the arrangement to situations as they had developed overtime.
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Looking at particular cases, one sees that the travaux do not always clarify the parties' intentions. Consider, for example, the role of travaux in the Boll case. 64 The question on which several judges focused was whether there should be an interpretation of the agreement which implied an ordre public clause when none was stated in the document The history of the Hague Convention that generated the agreement showed that mere had been extensive discussion about the advisability of inserting an ordre public provision.
63 Some judges thought that the fact that no such language emerged in the operative text was good reason for taking the Convention at face value. Others thought that there was such a tradition in favour of its inclusion that even its omission after due deliberation did not exclude it According to this view apparently it would have been necessary to have an explicit vote against inclusion or an express exclusionary clause in the final agreement 66 Yet at times the travaux do seem to be helpfuL Sometimes they clarify die assumptions the drafters were using when they employed certain language -for example, the Continental legal terms that found their way into the Warsaw Convention.
67 Sometimes they are useful to domestic authorities in other ways. One example might be a situation in which the treaty does not contain details about the way in which the internal law of one of the member States is to be changed by the treatyits inclusion would have simply overloaded the text But statements by die delegation of die country in question may have clarified die matter -and may have been communicated to its legislature and used in drafting the implementing legislation.
A special set of questions revolves around the use of domestic legislative history to shape die meaning of an international agreement There are those who argue that, 
The Translation Problem
A persistent source of difficulties with reading treaties is the fact that nations speaking different languages must achieve a common meaning. interpretation. Or it may be that the treaty so clearly emerged from one language and one legal system that the reader needs to emphasize that text For example, the official words in the Warsaw Convention describing situations in which the damage limitation on suits against air carriers does not apply are 'dol ou... faute lourde'. 84 These words were written into the Convention in 1929 by European lawyers. They brought with them ideas about the boundaries of that concept that they had derived from domestic systems. The US Supreme Court has gone a considerable distance in ransacking that learning in the search for a useful delimitation of the concept, even though the American participants in the ratification process knew little about those texts.
D. A Case Study
The people who become involved in the drafting and interpretive process with respect to treaties are numerous, disparate and unpredictable. Let us take one example, perhaps a bit extreme but not wholly uncharacteristic. Article 18 of die Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929 provided that prisoners were to salute officers of the captor country. 86 That provision was, like the rest of the Convention, -produced by a diplomatic conference called to take care of weaknesses in the Hague Convention of 1907 that had been made apparent by the grim experiences of World War I. 87 The conference was attended by some 138 representatives of 47 countries, military personnel, doctors and professional diplomats. 88 When completed, the text, drafted and signed in French, was taken home to the participating States. There it was translated and presented to various national legislatures for approval prior to ratification. Many of those legislators had never undertaken any military service or represented their countries abroad.
In 1944 a dispute arose about the meaning of that clause. 89 From 1939 to 1944 allied prisoners of war in Germany had saluted their German captors in the traditional way, touching their right hands to the visors of tbeir caps. The Germans had returned the salute in the same fashion. Note that die Convention does not specify that the salute be returned; evidently it was a universal assumption embedded in military tradition that a salute unreturned is like the sound of one hand clapping. But after the failure of the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, the FQhrer ordered that regular German army troops salute in the Nazi style, raising their right hands with their palms facing out Personnel at German prisoner camps began to return British and American salutes Nazi-fashion and the British protested. 90 German captives in Allied camps insisted on the right to initiate the exchange with a Nazi salute. After negotiation between the camp administrative personnel and representatives of the captives, resort was made to the services of the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross which served as protecting power pursuant to the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The conclusion, reflected in the 1949 Geneva Convention, is that a prisoner may use the salute that is prevalent in the army to which he or she is serving.
9 ' Thus we find interpretations of the Convention being presented and considered by persons far away from the original negotiating process. Most of them were not lawyers and they had no access to the travauxpriparatoires (which, as so often happens, would not have been helpful). There was no decision-maker to force a solution upon the parties. Yet it is apparent that the parties in dispute, although coming from different and at the time violently hostile states, did share assumptions about what a 'salute' was, and when and how one should be rendered. Indeed, it seems likely that professional and traditional German officers had more in common on this point with their British counterparts than with their Nazi colleagues.
Is it possible to characterize the ensemble of people involved in writing, enacting and then interpreting the Geneva Convention of 1929 as an interpretive community?
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They are so diverse in background and interests that the mind rebels. But perhaps it is possible to salvage the idea that it is a community, first by reminding oneself that the term 'language* is not necessarily the same in the definition of interpretive community as it is in ordinary parlance. So long as decent translations are available the disparity of language in that sense may not add overwhelmingly to the problem of reading the text And an interpretive community can cut across national frontiers -as do many scientific and intellectual communities. If one thinks of the practice in question as 'saluting' it is apparent that members of the armed forces of the world shared common ideas as to how one did it and what it meant Persons outside the armed forces had either gleaned some idea about saluting from literature or conversation, or informed themselves about it, more or less, during the ratifying or advice and consent process. In this limited sense one can consider those involved with the Geneva Convention as constituting an ad hoc community with overlapping sub-categories of military officers, diplomats, congressional personnel. Red Cross emissaries and so on. This problem confronts us with a Vienna Convention question: to whom must the language be ordinary? Before 1940 almost everybody would have thought they knew what a salute was. The dictionaries, French, English and so on, would not have been particularly helpful because the term 'salute' tends to stretch from the firing of twentyone cannons to a kiss on the cheek. Teleology or purposiveness would suggest that the Convention meant to support the self-esteem of captured personnel and to force the captors to recognize that they continued to be human beings and military personnel. This purpose also appears in articles allowing prisoners to retain insignia of rank and decorations, limiting the sorts of work they can be compelled to do and so forth. 93 All of these are meant to prevent the degradations that commonly confront a civilian convicted of a crime. However, that purpose may be ambiguous -should the captive be allowed to render the form of salute he or she is used to? Or should he or she be made to adhere to a universally recognized norm?
IV. US Styles of Interpretation
When one turns to the American legal scene one finds an avalanche of theories and ideas about interpretation, in sharp contrast to the relative quiescence of international law. Looking more closely one finds that the theories cluster about different types of documents. We examine first constitutional interpretation, then statutory construction and finally contract work. There is limited cross referencing between these bodies of learning, although there is beginning to be some between constitutional and statutory interpretation.
94 Some theories of interpretation are strictly academic and have been quite crisply rejected or ignored by the judges; they therefore have little to say about the actual interpretation of US documents and are even less likely to influence treaty construction. This diminishes the danger that the United States will follow its own idiosyncratic path in the treaty process.
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A. Constitutional Interpretation
Schools of Constitutional Interpretation
Perhaps no other document poses a more difficult challenge for the judicial interpreter than the United States Constitution. Even in comparison with its counterparts in other countries, we find that it is (1) considerably older than other constitutions, most of which were written after 1945, (2) considerably shorter and less detailed and (3) harder to amend if its interpretation fails to satisfy the public. All of this has created special problems for the Supreme Court, which are further enhanced by the political sensitivity of the issues to be decided. This sensitivity has at times caused the court to assert that it was bound by the Constitution in a very precise way, that it had no choice but to proffer the ruling made. 96 A theory that will accommodate such demands is hard to find and defend.
For a long time the function was filled by a textualism which was not so very different from that celebrated by treatise writers and judges of international law. Textualism, however, became the central target of first the realist movement and men of critical legal studies. 97 The first wave clearly had the sympathy of many judges. In particular Holmes and Learned Hand made comments about construction -for example the famous phrases 'a word is the skin of a living thought' 98 and '[you cannot] make a fortress out of the dictionary' 99 -that were entirely in keeping wim the realist critique of formalism. When the second wave came along the judges were not ready to fraternize with it For one thing, it was too closely associated with vaguely left-wing politics, and for another, its implications, at least in the more sweeping formulations, struck at the root of the whole process of judging. In that vein. Justice Scalia said:
Not that I agree with or even take very seriously, the intricately elaborated scholarly criticisms to the effect that (believe it or not) words have no meaning. They have meaning enough...
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One rival for the position of leading constitutional construction theory has been originalism. 101 In some versions, it mandates a thorough review of documentation and testimony contemporaneous with the establishment of the text itself. Gues about what the authors meant can be found in anything they wrote or said. It is a difficult search which can never be completed. The records of the Philadelphia convention were in fact not complete and in some cases inaccurate. New letters from important delegates were 96 The fact that the Supreme Courtis not a representative institution lies ai the base of the need to create a belief that it u 'constrained' by the text Perry, The Court, taking reality into consideration, should at the same tune have in mind the strict observation of the Charter. I am prepared to stress the necessity of the strict observation and proper interpretation of the provisions of the charter, its rules, without limiting itself by reference to the purposes of the Organization; otherwise one would have to come to the long ago condemned formula: The ends justify the means.' (...) It has been said that you cannot leave one word out of a song. The Charter represents one of the most important international multilateral treaties, from which it is impossible to leave out any of its provisions either directly or through an interpretation that is more artificial than skillful.
1 "
One can say that the interpretation of the Charter by the Court has tended to be cautious, that at least throughout 1962 it was applied in the way desired by the United States and American judges. Commentators tended to be content with it and the Russians unhappy. On the whole it deferred to political decisions made by the other branches of the UN organization.
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The Treaty of Rome has virtually become a constitution of a federal state and thus the extensive output of the European Court of Justice has formed a body of law that is" almost easier to analyse by comparison to the US Constitution than to other treaties. 
DetkvF.Vagts
Beyond doubt the English courts must follow the same principles as the European Court. Otherwise there would be differences between the countries of the nine. That would never do. All the courts of all nine countries should interpret the treaty in the same way. They should all apply the same principles... What a task is thus set before us! The treaty is quite unlike any of the enactments to which we have become accustomed. The draftsmen of our statutes have striven to express themselves with the utmost exactness. They have tried to foresee all possible circumstances that may arise and to provide for them. They have sacrificed style and simplicity. They have foregone brevity. They have become long and involved. In consequence, the judges have followed suit They interpret a statute as applying only to the circumstances covered by the very words. The European Court of Human Rights deals with a document that is, in a sense, a bill of rights standing without the institutional framework provided by the US Constitution.
121 Many of its provisions read as if they were the product of drafters familiar with the great eighteenth century documents, the US Constitution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. For example, Article 10 of the Convention is approximately four times the length of the First Amendment and deals only with freedom of expression. It is modernized to include media not imagined by Madison.
It states at considerable length exceptions to freedom of expression, and includes provisions which protect national security, the reputation of others, and the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
122 Each exception has some counterpart in the case-law generated by the US system over two centuries. The detail in the Convention's drafting has not alleviated the resolution of problems of free speech that are classic in American Constitutional law. In other fields, despite the recency and specificity of the Convention, the Strasbourg court has found in it unstated rights which the US Supreme Court has failed to see.
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has not as yet developed a body of case-law comparable to that of the European court, but some of its judgments point in the direction of similar developments. 
B. US Statutory Construction
US Statutory Readings
In evaluating the statutory construction ideas emanating from the United States the reader accustomed to parliamentary systems must make some adjustments. US laws do not emerge from the executive and pass speedily through a parliament controlled by the same party that occupies the cabinet American statutes are filed by members of Congress -sometimes at the behest of the executive -and then travel complicated routes through a bicameral body. They are frequently amended in the process. Some of the ideas on statutory interpretation come from judges who were appointed during the long period when Republican presidents controlled the executive power -including judicial appointments -but were confronted with one or both houses of Congress controlled by the Democratic party, thereby creating difficulties for presidential legislative initiatives. One has to evaluate their ideas with this background in mind.
American learning on statutory construction was brought out of a wasteland of ad hoc dicta, resonant but empty maxims and protestations of simple fidelity to texts by the critiques of such semi-realist writers as Frankfurter, Landis and Radin. After World War n 127 an influential book by Professors Hart and Sacks, 128 entitled The Legal Process developed a theory of the relative roles of legislatures and courts that made it possible to think coherently about the topic. In their view the courts should think of themselves as being partners of the legislature, and respectfully examine its work for indications of its underlying purposes. Given that the chief policy-making agency of society was the legislative, Hart and Sacks believed that an understanding of its position was essential. The Legal Process writers assumed that norms of judicial decisionmaking would follow from the craftsmanship of the interpreters and their commitment to skilled (and prudential) decisionmaking rather than some elusive commitment to objective legal reasoning.
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They stressed the collaborative nature of the interpretive process and the assumption that legislatures were consistently pursuing a social calculus aimed at the greater good of society. While the instructions issued to the judges from this scholarship were addressed to the way in which they should approach the documents rather than to the statutory language itself, adherence to the Legal Process model would give a distinct slant to opinions and presumably the outcomes. The so-called 'new legal process' scholars of the 1980s and 1990s moved the ideology of interpretation in a different A priori, the consequences of this analysis for statutory construction are ambiguous. One could deduce from this description the rule that a court or other reader should try to understand the nature of the bargain struck between the parties in the legislature and choose the reading of the statute which would best effectuate their common understanding. 133 In other words, one should read statutes as if they were multilateral contracts. The role this version assigns to the courts is, however, an awkward one that is hard to ground in any traditional political theory. Another approach would have the courts disregarding the underlying bargain and holding the statute to a reading that adopted the pretence that there had been a legislative intention to pursue a common good, even though the court knows or guesses that there was none. 134 On the first approach it seems important to read the legislative history to discover just what sort of a bargain there was. On the second, one would slam the door shut on the legislative history and any evidence it might convey as to what the factions actually wanted, because that desire is illegitimate and irrelevant On the whole, the latter deduction is the one that is being made by the courts, with the result that interest group analysis feeds into the textualism being practised by the courts. 133 It also seems to push in the direction of deferring to views of statutory meaning expressed by the agency charged with its enforcement, although the idea that administrative agencies are significantly more liberated from interest group struggles than Congress is does not appeal to one's intuitive views about the political scene.
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One advantage of this approach would be that it raises the cost of lobbying -one must 'buy' a completed statute rather than efforts of one or two members of Congress who can succeed in getting some history into the record. 137 A further aspect of the textualist statutory approach is the emphasis it places on reading the particular statute in dispute against the whole corpus of existing legislation. All parts of it have equal dignity as the product of Congress, and should be given the best possible joint reading so as to create a seamless web of directions. 
Implications for Reading Treaties
Can one derive any support for any particular slant on treaty interpretation out of American statutory analysis, in particular from public choice theory? As one considers the implications of their view that statutes are 'deals' made by interest groups in the legislature, one remembers that treaties are, after all, contracts in one sense. 139 The law of treaties grew out of the law of contracts and is still shaped very much like a Restatement of Contracts or a contracts text There need be no embarrassment about the idea that there was horse trading in the course of creating the document; that is most clear with bilateral agreements but it is true even in the case of multilateral arrangements such as the Law of the Sea Convention that purport to lay down legal rules.
14° One cannot begin to understand its provisions unless one knows of the ways in which the interests of the major naval powers were played off against those of the states wanting control of wider fisheries zones, as well as a share in the supposed riches of the deep sea bed. It is perhaps least true for those conventions that have as their goal the setting up of rules to govern the behaviour of private parties, but even there it is bard to grasp the rules on private activity in those treaties unless one understands how the national interests related to those private activities were traded off. For example, the protection against liability that was given to airline companies in the Warsaw Convention takes its shape from the fears of the signatory states that 'their' airlines would be overwhelmed by huge and unpredictable tort claims, and so would be unable to function as national flag carriers.
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Therefore, the interpreters of treaties, in particular national courts that are strangers to the treaty field, need to work for an understanding of the processes that brought the agreement into existence. They will need that knowledge even if they hesitate to rely heavily on history and other matters not embodied in the text because it is only with such an awareness that the words of the agreement come into focus.
C. US Contract Interpretation
Theories of Contract Interpretation
Early in the twentieth century American contract law placed strong emphasis on the external meaning of the text The courts asserted that they would reject the internal intention of a party even if twenty bishops swore to iL 142 The objective theory of contracts has certain implications for their interpretation, for example in excluding evidence of the parties' private intentions and expectations (making the parol evidence rule roughly parallel to a treaty rule against using travauxpreparatoires). Many judges went further and assumed that the objective meaning could be derived from the text alone, assisted by a few general rules or maxims, in much the same way as they thought statutes could be read. This confidence drew the fire of the legal realists. These writers drew attention to the vagueness and indeterminacy of contracts and to the degree to which other factors influenced the way the judges read them. 143 Karl Llewellyn in particular saw the secret of appropriate interpretation as being located in the degree of the judges' awareness of commercial realities and the understandings that emerged from them. 144 He saw grave dangers in purely lawyerly readings of texts that were written in the context of commercial practices that the practitioners did not feel they needed to make explicit because 'everybody' understood them. Cures for the problem would be found by giving the matter to arbitrators or commercial judges steeped in the merchants' ways of conducting affairs, by providing texts that incorporated merchants' understandings and by sounding out the views of those actively engaged in the business. A major measure of success was achieved by employing these methods; the Uniform Commercial Code, even though without some of Llewellyn's proposed innovations, comes as close as is possible to commercial reality and allows the merchant community various ways of making its views known, ranging from the many provisions that incorporate ideas of commercial reasonableness to the participation of business lawyers in the ongoing process of updating the Code.
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Llewellyn's thinking about contract construction is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code's general provision;
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The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
Recently American contract interpretation theory has been influenced by law and economics modes of analysis. This analysis concentrates on the 'efficiency' of interpretive rules, in particular upon default rules that are meant to fill in gaps left by the parties in making their agreements.
147 That efficiency involves a number of calculations. A court would need to take into account the fact that it is efficient for contracting parties not to expend time and money in providing for remote contingencies, particularly if they can rely upon the courts to make sensible decisions about the contingency if it in fact arises. A ruling should be judged in the light of the predictable reaction to it by other contracting parties; thus one should favour a rule that either parties will not wish to contract around or one which they can contract around more easily if they so choose. In a sense, this puts judges in the position of the drafters of legislation or trade association rules that prescribe definitions or clauses that will be assumed to have been adopted by contracting parties.
One notable feature of contract interpretation theories is their tendency to aggregate contracts into classes, and to consider the appropriateness of a construction beyond the interests of the two parties to the single contract under adjudication. In a sense the courts view themselves as participants in an ongoing process. The announcement of outcome A not only settles the matter as between litigating parties One and Two but warns parties Three and Four who are contemplating similar arrangements that outcome A will govern their contracts if a similar problem arisesunless Three and Four expressly provide otherwise. The characteristic of an outcome as being easier to bargain around in later cases by other people, who were on notice of the court's determination, is important to analysts of this persuasion. Such a line of 
VIIL Conclusions
In each of the fields of American law we have examined, as well as international law, the prevailing doctrine asserts that the ordinary meaning of the text governs when it offers an acceptable solution. It is the most favourable solution and is an efficient means of coordinating the many parties involved. 151 Modern linguistic theory makes the contrary contention that the meaning shared by the relevant interpretive community should apply, for no answer arises from the mere words on a page. Accepting that, legal doctrine would argue that the meaning which is attainable by all readers should apply, or perhaps all lawyers or all international lawyers. 132 But even with the careful drafting that prevails in international agreements, there are going to be questions which the ordinary meaning cannot answer -sometimes there is a deliberate vagueness designed to give leeway to interpreters or negotiators in the future, or sometimes a factual circumstance arises which the drafters had not anticipated. In general, however, the expectation of treaty-drafters is that their efforts will be taken seriously and that the words they chose will be read as their community understands them.
The contending theories here discussed also differ on the approach to be employed when the plain meaning of the text proffers no adequate answer for a given problem. Two widely supported schools of thought go to the intentions of the drafters of the text and the meaning that contemporaries would generally apply to the text The intentions of the drafters seems to be important in international law because of the degree to which international law is based upon the consent of the sovereign States that make up the global society. But that approach encounters great difficulties where, as in a constitution or a multilateral treaty, a wide variety of different human individuals, acting for a variety of constituencies, participate in the negotiating, drafting, signing and ratification of the document While the travauxpriparatoires and other evidences may give some clues as to what some participants thought, the answer is likely to be partial at best As Professor/Judge Pescatore has said: It is not, in actual fact, on the intentions of the contracting parties that agreement is reached, but only on the written formulas of the treaties and only on that. It is by no means certain that agreement on a text in any way implies agreement as to intentions. On the contrary, divergent, even conflicting, intentions may perfectly well underlie a given text.. 
